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Abstract: Methods for the analysis of work accidents are discussed, and
a description is given of the use of a causal situation analysis in terms
of a "variation tree" in order to explain the course of events of the
individual cases and to identify possible improvements. The difficulties
in identifying "causes" of accidents are discussed, and it is proposed to
analyse accident reports with the specific aim of identifying the potential
for future improvements rather than causes of past events. In contrast
to traditional statistical analysis of work accident data, which typically
give very general recommendations, the method proposed identifies very
explicit countermeasures. Improvements require a change in human
decisions during equipment design, work planning, or the execution
itself. The use of a model of human behaviour drawing a distinction
between automated skill-based behaviour, rule-based "know-how" and
knowledge-based analysis is proposed for identification of the human
decisions which are most sensitive to improvements.
1. INTRODUCTION
In different branches of industry, different methods have been
developed for analysis of incidents and accidents in order to identify
their causes and propose improvements for safety. Within process
industries characterised by large production units and high levels of
automation, risk and accident analysis is focused on avoidance of low
probability events with large consequences to the plant and its
environment. Analysis is here based on causal models of the
accidental chains of events which can serve to identify deficiencies in
the design of the plant and its protective systems, as well as to predict
the level of risk involved in operation. Detailed analysis of the actual,
individual incidents and accidents is normally performed to identify
these possible weak spots in the plant and its operation. It is a
general experience that human acts play an important role in such
industrial accidents, and much effort is spent to include human
performance in the causal accident models. This approach is feasible
because of the well structured nature of industrial process plants,
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which also leads to a well defined task structure for the operators
involved.
The situation is quite different for safety aspects related to
workshops and construction sites, characterised by much less
structured work situations and a high number of reported cases.
Consequently, analysis is typically based on statistical and epi-
demiological methods rather than detailed causal analyses of the
individual cases. Such analyses are generally based on an analysis of
the routine reports collected by safety authorities which give only
sparse information on the individual events and, in particular, on the
work conditions and the normal routines which led to the case
[Leplat, 1978, 1982]. Typically, such data are used for management
and insurance purposes, rather than design of countermeasures.
During recent years, several attempts have been made to use the
causal situation analysis on work accidents; a promising approach
has been the "I.N.R.S. method" described in the following section.
However, the aim of this method as well as other attempts have often
been to explain the individual cases; to identify the causes of the acci-
dents.
The present paper suggests an analysis which focuses on the
identification of points in the sequence which are sensitive to future
improvements rather than causes of past events. It is based on the
"analysis of variations" developed for analysis of work accidents,
combined with a model of human decision making based on analysis
of human performance and errors in process plants.
2. ANALYSIS OF INCIDENTS/ACCIDENTS
In this first part, a method which is useful for bringing some light
upon the causation of incidents and accidents is described. Reliability
specialists have long been interested in this problem and typically will
use fault tree analysis in order "to model the system conditions that
can result in the undesired event" (. . . ) "A fault tree is a model that
graphically and logically represents the various combinations of
possible events, both faulty and normal, occurring in a system that
leads to the top event" [Barlow and Lambert, 1975, p. 8]. In the
present context, the top event will be the incident or accident. The
application of this method presupposes a number of conditions,
typically related to the well-defined structure of process plants and
other technical machinery, which are rarely found in socio-technical
systems. The method presented here is certainly less systematic, but
its possibilities of use are much broader, for instance for study of
work accidents in workshops and construction sites. In particular,
when used for post hoc analysis, it differs from the fault tree on one
specific point: the top event is not a class of events but one particular
event—incident or accident—which actually occurred and for which
the antecedent chain of events must be discovered. The tree obtained
is, formally, a sub-tree of the fault tree (which would include a family
of possible chains of events leading to the same type of accident). This
subtree is peculiar in having no "OR gates". Combining a number of
such sub-trees for a given type of accident would lead to a fault tree,
defined after the fact.
(a) The method of variation tree1
This method is based on the idea that the occurrence of an accident
results from aberrations or variations happening in the normal or
"habitual" work situation. During the analysis of an incident or
accident, it is first necessary to identify such changes; i.e. to establish
a list of changes and then to organize them in order to define their
interrelationship. The two most important relations are the following:
The event-chain relationship, noted X->Y. Indicates that event X is a
necessary condition for the occurrence of event Y, or that without
event X, event Y would not have occurred.
The confluence relationship, noted X1,X2->Y. Indicates that the
simultaneous presence of several (here two) independent events or
states is necessary for the occurrence of event Y. It can be expressed:
"without event Xl or X2, event Y would not have occurred". Of course
other Xi may be necessary for the occurrence of Y; they are not
mentioned because they are not "variations".
This method can be illustrated by a simple diagram of an accident
on a drilling machine.
Remarks
(I) To build this diagram, it is necessary to know the activity (in more
or less detail, depending on the case) in order to define the
variations and the relations between them. Let us consider for
example the relation X~ Y. Y can depend on X through a physical
necessity, e.g. the clothing must be in contact with the drill in
order to be caught. Y can depend on X due to operating rules and
practice. The machine is set in motion, e.g. because the operator
manipulates the starting button. Y can depend on X due to
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organizational rules, e.g. the machine is set in motion because an
order is given by the supervisor. One must add "etc." to this list.
The existence of many relations depends on the subjective
perception of relations by the operator: relations may therefore
depend on the individual operator and be difficult to identify after
the fact.
(2) The diagram of variations constitutes only a part of the generic
diagram representing causation. When one reads X~ Y, one must
be aware of translating "X entails Y" because X is a necessary but,
however, not a sufficient condition to produce Y. It will sometimes
be helpful to introduce in the diagram of variations a number of
normal operating states or events in order to have a greater insight
into the causal mechanisms and, thus, of possible preventive
measures. For instance, on the diagram of Fig. I, a branch can be
added to the conjunction which would be "drill is rotating". It
would permit a better understanding of the final event. Therefore,
the diagram of variations should be considered as a support to the
analysis of causation of an accident.
(3) The variations can be classified in several categories. The I.N.R.S.
method classifies them according to the following socio-technical
categories [Krawsky et al., 1972]: I (individual),T (task), M
(machine), E (environment). In the method of analysis presented in
the following paragraphs, we distinguish between the states of the
system or its elements, and the events (or actions) which are
changes of the states. We are here concerned particularly with the
individual and his actions.
(b) An example—a driving accident
To illustrate the diagram of variations and to have a case for further
discussion in subsequent sections, the following accident is
considered.
A lorry driver is ordered to deliver a cargo at a certain destination.
As his usual lorry has had a break-down, he picks up a replacement
lorry, which is unfamiliar to him and, as it turns out, has faulty
brakes. The lorry is then loaded and in fact overloaded. On route it
appears that the route the driver usually takes is closed due to road
repair. The driver takes a detour which turns out to have an
unexpected steep slope. Due to slope, load, and bad brakes, the driver
loses control and is unable to follow the curve in the road. He runs he
lorry into a wall and is severely injured. The diagram of variations is
shown on Fig. 2.
(c) The combination of the diagrams of variations
When a number of incidents or accidents have been analysed on the
same system, for example on the same type of machine, we can try to
merge the corresponding diagrams of variations. This has been done
by Bruun et al. [1979] by means of cause-consequence charts,
proposed by Nielsen ~1975]. Figure 3 gives the main elements of such
a diagram. Figure 4 shows the principle of the combination of
diagrams from a simple example. Bruun et al. [1979] give more
complete examples obtained from a set of accidents which occurred
on drilling machines.
In order that a set of diagrams can be merged, a number of
conditions of homogeneity must be met which are expressed by Bruun
et al. [1979, p. 7] as follows:
—"Choose the same starting point for analysis of similar accidents".
—"Choose the same level of detail for recording each accident".
—"Trace the causes of accidents backwards to the same stage in
causation".
—"Use the same terms at each stage in the accident descriptions to
describe identical events or conditions".
One can add "Have a consistent concept of variation". To merge the
diagrams, it will sometimes be necessary to complete them with
elements which are not variations (but normal states, activities, or
events). The formation of merged (or synthetic) diagrams permits the
evaluation of the risk presented by some characteristics of the opera-
tor and machine (from the frequency of incidents and accidents) and
the identification of critical routes leading to the accident: in
consequence, its usefulness for preventive safety measures is quite
clear.
3. ANALYSIS OF HUMAN ERRORS
The analysis of human errors and their role in industrial accidents is
an important part of the development of systematic methods for
industrial reliability and risk prediction. In order to obtain data for
such predictive analyses, for instance by means of fault trees, as
previously mentioned, it is necessary to analyse accidents and
incidents to identify their causes in terms of component failures and
human errors, since data on the frequency of such causes will make it
possible to estimate the probability of the related chains of events
during design of new systems.
However, the determination of how far back in an accidental chain
of events it is necessary to go in order to find its causes is a matter of
practical judgement and depends on the purpose of the analysis.
Typically, if a component failure is identified at a level where the
component is easily replaced, this component failure is taken as the
cause if no special circumstances make it necessary to trace further
back to identify causes in terms of production or design deficiencies.
Definition of human errors is even more ambiguous, since the human
typically will notice inappropriate actions and correct them before
they lead to unacceptable consequences. Therefore, whether a given
inappropriate act will count as an error and contribute to the
frequency of causes depends as much upon the characteristics of the
work environment in terms of immediate error observability and
reversibility as it depends on human error frequencies.
A more fruitful point of view is to consider human errors as
instances of man-machine misfits, i.e. instances when human
variability is not within the span acceptable for successful task
performance [Rasmussen, 1981]. Variations in performance become
human errors only in an "unkind" environment which does not allow
immediate correction. This means that to characterize human
"errors", one has to determine the variability of human behaviour and
the acceptance limits for variation which hold for the work situation.
Generally, human errors are defined in terms of the faulty, external
task element and data are collected correspondingly. If, however, the
point of view of variability of human behaviour is taken, it is
necessary to identify the varying element of human behaviour in
terms referring to the internal human properties.
There is no one-to-one relationship between the external task
performance and the internal human functions which are used.
Consequently, to characterize the human role in an accidental chain
of events, it is necessary also to consider the internal mental decision
functions which are required in the task (Fig. 6), the related internal
psychological mechanisms which are involved in the error (Fig. 5), and
the possible presence of external causes to the particular human
response. The internal decision functions and error mechanisms
depend on the psychological functions and level of knowledge which
are activated by subjective factors in a particular situation. They
cannot be directly observed but must be inferred from characteristics
of the task and the work situation together with the external
manifestation of the error. For this to be possible, a model of human
information processing must be available. Such a model must relate
elements of human decision making and action to internal
information processes for which generic psychological mechanisms
and limitations can be identified. An attempt to develop such a model
from analysis of verbal protocols and cases of human malfunction has
been described elsewhere [Rasmussen, 1976,1980]. In this model, a
distinction is drawn between three levels of behaviour: skill-, rule-,
and knowledge-based performance, see Fig. 5. The figure illustrates
how different internal mechanisms are used for the same decision
function, depending upon the degree of familiarity with the work
situation and task element.
The use of such a model in the design of a multi-facet taxonomy for
human errors to be used for data collection by analysis of event
reports has been proposed elsewhere [Rasmussen, 1981]. For
reliability prediction, this approach may be useful for the design of
man-machine interface systems for industrial process plants. The
highly structured functional properties of such systems lead to a fairly
well defined anatomy of accidents, in which causes and latent failure
conditions can be reasonably well defined and identified by post hoc
analysis.
For less structured work situations and hence for the study of
common work accidents, this approach is not immediately attractive,
since the causal net and its topology are not so well defined, and the
reference situations used to define errors and causes are therefore
questionable. It appears, however, that a promising approach can be
found if the analysis of accidents is oriented more to the identification
of future improvements than towards past causes. This will be
discussed in more detail in the following section.
4. ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENTS FOR POINTS OF CRITICAL
DECISIONS
A common feature of the two approaches to the analysis of accidents
and incidents discussed in the two preceding sections is the view of
such events as the consequences of chains of events released and/or
conditioned by a number of "variations" with respect to a normally
successful performance. It appeared to us that this view, if carried
further in its consequences, could lead to a more fruitful approach to
the post hoc analysis of accidents. Rather than identifying causes of
accidents in order to collect data for their frequency or to find means
for their removal—or, as is frequently the case, to find someone to
blame—it appears to be more appropriate to map an accident as a
tree of variations and to look for the effect of variations towards safety
which might be introduced. It may be much more fruitful to introduce
a variation that will break the accidental sequence than to try to
remove its cause(s). In the following we discuss this approach in more
detail. In effect, it amounts to finding critical decision points where
conditions for existing decisions or acts can be improved or new deci-
sions can be inserted to change the route of events in a safe direction.
The basis for the analysis will be a variation diagram, as discussed
in Section II. This diagram should be prepared very carefully in order
to identify "variation" antecedents to the accidental event as well as
"state" antecedents. State antecedents are states which act by
conditioning the work context and therefore prepare the route of
events. They are very likely.latent effects of previous variations with
respect to a safe condition, since the nodes of the diagram are
typically variations from normal.
What kind of changes can be introduced to break the flow of events
in the variation diagram? It appears immediately that the course of
events is broken if the conditions producing a variation are removed
or the effects cancelled. However, since the release condition for one
node of variation is the effect of an antecedent variation, it appears
that a general rule will be to cancel a variation node, either by
changing the physical condition (replace a worn tyre on a car), or
changing the basis for a human act (by training, better information in
the situation, or more tolerant work conditions). In case of confluence
relationships, it suffices to cancel one of the necessary events (see Fig.
I) or state antecedents. In other words, the problem is to identify those
changes or improvements which will eliminate the effect of human
variability during the course of events, or will counteract prior
variations or decisions, for instance during the design phase, which
lead to antecedent states preparing the route of the accident.
Another possibility will be to break the.flow of events between nodes
in the diagram of variations. What change can sensibly be introduced
that will activate a human to make a decision in the sequence which
breaks or corrects the flow of events? How can the mental state of
humans or the work condition be changed so as to lead a person
involved to detect and correct the risky conditions?
To develop this approach into a practical method, at least two major
problems should be considered.
First, considering a single accident case, it is very easy to suggest
many changes ad hoc which would break the sequence. Therefore a
screening method must be found to select the reasonable candidates.
One such method could be to superimpose a number of variation
diagrams with suggestions for changes, derived for similar accident
sequences or similar work conditions, in order to identify changes
which have recurrent effect, and thus reject ad hoc candidates which
are only relevant for a single case. ~
It is by no means a new idea to try to identify factors which can be
changed in order to break accident sequences. However, this is
typically done by generalizing into a few categories of improvement
during the analysis of the individual cases, or by making correlation
analyses between accident statistics and a number of general factors
as level of education, weather conditions, etc. Typically, this analysis
is performed as standard statistical analysis directly on the data
contained in the accident reports collected by work safety authorities.
In practice this leads to very general recommendations like better
education, more effective maintenance, etc., which are very difficult to
implement or make operational. In the approach proposed here, the
changes are identified very explicitly and in detail for every case, and
generalisation is only made after a high number of cases have been
merged. This makes the identified changes very specific and
operational. However, this kind of analysis cannot be undertaken in
the same way as standard statistical analyses of the data in accident
reports. It is necessary to convert the data in routine reports into
diagrams of variations; i.e. the accident reports should be related to
knowledge of the normal, successful performance. This means that
information should be added to the reports which is only available
from persons intimately familiar with the normal work routine, as for
instance supervisors or work safety representatives on site.
Second, we have to identify the changes in work conditions or in
human disposition which will cause the proper decisions to be made.
It is a general observation that motivation programs or request that
people should "try harder" have limited effect. This problem will be
discussed in more detail in relation to the human performance model,
but first we have to identify the kind of decisions we want to
influence.
In general, analysis of accidents and the resulting diagram of
variations will be expressed as a sequence or tree including
observable physical events or human acts. In order to identify means
for breaking the sequence we will be looking for nodes in the diagram
which are sensitive to cancelling. For nodes representing inappropriate
acts, this must be done by improving conditions for human decision
and acting during the situation. For nodes representing abnormal
states of the physical work environment, cancelling involves
improvement of this physical condition, i.e. the conditions for decision
making during work planning or system design must be evaluated for
possible improvements.
Looking for suitable means for breaking the sequence by removing
the causal relation among nodes, we can also look for reasonable
points when people during the event can be made aware of the risky
course of events and enabled to make decisions which can break the
sequence or change its course. In addition, we can look for suitable
locations for physical changes which will act as barriers against the
flow of events. This means to look for suitable decision points during
work or system design.
It will be seen that the analysis focuses the attention on decisions
related to the variations at all levels in an organisation, not only the
worker directly involved. For overloading the truck in the example of
Fig. 2, not only the loading itself, but also driving schedules, payment
policies and supervisory control must be considered.
It will in all cases be necessary to evaluate all phases of the
sequence involved in human decision making and acting in order to
identify the sensitivity to improvement, i.e. whether support should be
given to detection of the course of event under way, to identification of
the problem, to evaluation of goals and priorities, or to planning and
execution of the intervention. In some cases, just making the person
aware that the potential for a risky chain of events is present will
activate proper decisions. In other cases, support of proper
identification of the circumstances will be vital, sometimes the
consideration of conflicting goals must be considered, and so forth.
To be able to judge the appropriate means for changing the
decisions of humans involved in the accidental chain of events or the
planning of work conditions, it is necessary to consider the level of
cognitive awareness of the persons during the situations in which it is
planned to change their decisions. The rational decision sequence
involving all phases is illustrated in Fig. 6 which also shows how their
relevance depends on the level of cognitive activity involved in the
performance; i.e. upon the training of the person. During highly
trained, skill-based routines, the decision sequence is not at all
activated; and during familiar tasks based on know-how, the higher
level decision phases by-passed by stereotype rules and habits. The
point here is that it will not be reasonable to base improvements on
support of decision phases which are in fact by-passed during the
actual situation. If an activity is controlled by highly skilled routines,
it will be less effective to change it by improving the knowledge of the
persons involved or by asking them to be more careful. The most
effective influence will be through changes of the work situation. This
means that it is necessary to identify a person in the work planning or
design phase who will work at a level of cognitive awareness and
whose decisions can be affected.
To conclude, we propose that the traditional search for means to
improve work safety through epidemiological analysis of accident
records based on statistical data and very general characteristics of
the work situation should be supplemented by detailed analysis of the
diagram of variations for each accident which includes experts' knowl-
edge of the normally successful work performance. Improvements are
identified for each case separately, carefully considering the level of
conscious awareness of the people involved in the specific situations
in order to eliminate psychologically infeasible ad hoc proposals.
Candidates for serious consideration as proposals for improvements
are then identified by an "overlay" of sets of variation diagrams for
similar work situations and types of accident in order to have a
screening against singular ad hoc proposals. The approach can be
illustrated by the following example.
Analysis of driving example, Fig. 2
First, we consider the possibility of cancelling the nodes of variation in
the diagram given in Fig. 2. The phases in the decision sequence
which are judged to be sensitive to improvements are indicated in Fig.
7 by the number of node to cancel indicated by (n) or path to break
indicated by In.
Cancelling nodes
(1), (2) and (3) related to road conditions do not lend themselves to
control in the present context. To propose a decreased slope appears
to be an ad hoc solution of low generality. (4) overload. Changes
towards safety may involve:
—Detection, makes driver alert by some kind of overload alarm.
—Observation, easy access to weight information.
—Evaluation, change criteria for judgement. It will probably be
difficult to influence highly skilled people at this level by
motivational programs, etc. Therefore, changes involve changes in
work condition and social context, i.e. decisions in work planning
context related to company policy, payment, penalties, etc.
(5) and (6) faulty truck and replacement. Change the rules of
allocation of trucks. (7) inadequate maintenance. Reorganize the
maintenance department. (8) brakes faulty:
—Detection; worn brake alarm devices; regular inspection. —
Evaluation; changing criteria, penalties.
(9), (10) and (11) loss of control. Since the driver at this point is well
aware of the problem, cancelling will be related to defining the task to
pursue (to save the car/load/people/himself~ and to find the proper
procedures. Since skilled drivers do not depend on conscious
planning, verbal instruction will probably be less efficient than real
training in emergency procedures. (12) avoid injury. Cancelling here
involves introduction of protective devices such as safety belt,
absorbent lorry bodies, etc. This involves high level decisions during
lorry design.
Breaking paths
1. Avoiding steep slope route. Better slope information on route
(sign?); better understanding of slope/load relations (probably not
feasible for highly skilled driver who will not perform rational
evaluations).
2 Driver does not accept lorry with faulty brakes, as (8).
The general rule is that when an improvement can be envisaged
involving a certain decision phase, it will be necessary to find a person
in the system for whom that phase is active and not normally by-
passed by habits and routines. The list given above is meant to be
illustrative, not complete. Further screening of ad hoc solutions will be
needed by merging several diagrams for traffic accidents with heavy
trucks, either for accidents within the company or for accidents in
particular areas, depending on the purpose of the analysis.
5. CONCLUSION
The present paper proposes the general outline of an approach to the
analysis of work accidents with the specific aim of safety
improvement, rather than the evaluation and understanding of past
events. Further development is needed to evaluate its practical value.
For this purpose, a tight cooperation between several professional
areas is necessary in the analysis of events. The analysis requires
access to a representative number of uniform cases which is only
possible for a central safety authority. On the other hand, the analysis
requires that the routine event reports are studied by persons with an
intimate knowledge of the work situation, the normal work routines
and the tools and equipment used, as well as the organisational and
socio-technical relationships. This information is available only to
persons who participate in the particular industrial work situations
and, therefore, can identify "variations". Finally, the analysis requires
psychological expertise and knowledge about relevant models of
human decision making.
Development of the method therefore requires a mutual and
positive cooperation among representatives of industrial workers,
authorities and academic research—cooperation which has its own
problems and conflicts. From the test cases, however, it is our
experience that such a cooperation can be established, and that the
approach is worth pursuing.
The approach would serve to improve the skill of the safety officer
and, in general, contribute to a better management of reliability and
safety in socio-technical systems. In addition, it is worthwhile to
emphasize the amenability of the proposed method to further
improvements as the result of experience.
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